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INTRODUCTION 
We award patents to inventors because we hope to encourage new 
ideas.  Though it was not always so,1 for nearly four centuries the only justi-
fication for a government granting a private party the exclusive right to 
make a product has been the hope that doing so will encourage the inven-
 
*  William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; Partner, Durie Tangri LLP.  Thanks 
to Margo Bagley, Bernard Chao, Rose Hagan, Tim Holbrook, and Oskar Liivak and participants at the 
Works in Progress-Intellectual Property conference for comments on an earlier draft. 
1  The English Crown used to award patents that conferred the exclusive right to make a particular 
product as political favors.  A courtier might receive the exclusive right to make playing cards, for in-
stance, not because he had invented the playing card but simply as a means of acquiring money or regu-
lating trade in the cards.  See, e.g., Darcy v. Allin, (1599) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.); 11 Co. Rep. 84b.  
For discussion of the importance of these exceptions, see Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of 
the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 615 (1959).  That practice ended with the Statute of Mo-
nopolies in 1624.   
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tion and commercialization of that product.2  Scholars sometimes disagree 
over whether the patent system achieves this goal,3 and they frequently dis-
pute how patent law should go about encouraging innovation.4  But they es-
sentially all agree that the goal of the patent system is to encourage new 
invention.  For this reason, the fundamental requirement for obtaining a pa-
tent is that the applicant must have invented something new.5 
It is curious, then, that patent law itself purports to pay no attention to 
which aspects of a patentee’s invention are in fact new.  A patented inven-
tion is legally defined by its claims—written definitions of the invention.  
And those written definitions virtually never call out what it is that is new 
about the patentee’s invention.  For example, suppose that makers of wid-
gets have long used a three-step process to manufacture the widget.  The in-
ventor of a four-step process that results in higher-quality widgets will not 
claim to own merely the fourth step she has discovered.  Rather, she is 
much more likely to define her invention as including all four steps.  Our 
hypothetical patentee did not invent the first three steps: all three have been 
known in the art for decades.  But you wouldn’t know that fact from read-
ing the patent claims. 
Even if the parties do identify the novel element of an invention, the 
law purports not to care.  Longstanding patent law doctrine has decried any 
focus on the “point of novelty” of an invention.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which handles patent appeals, evaluates the 
claim as a whole, not just the piece of the claim that the patentee actually 
added to the storehouse of knowledge.  As that court has put it, “there is no 
legally recognizable . . . ‘gist,’ or ‘heart’ of the invention.”6   
Refusing to focus on the point of novelty sometimes benefits patent 
owners, for example when a court decides that an invention is novel be-
cause no one publication includes all the elements of the patent claim even 
though the invention adds nothing new to the world.  But it can also hurt 
 
2  See, e.g., Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); Klitzke, supra note 1, at 624 (cit-
ing an English proclamation in 1327 that tied the granting of franchises to the encouragement of 
progress in cloth-making).  
3  See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008) 
(arguing that patent law impedes innovation and should be abolished). 
4  See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 66–78 (2009) (describing various conflicting theories about how the patent system promotes 
innovation). 
5  See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (requiring novelty). 
6  See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Oskar Lii-
vak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim 1 (Feb. 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769270 (“The term ‘invention’ appears in many critical statutory locations.  
Yet we have been taught, perhaps brainwashed, to give the term zero substantive import.  Substantive 
use of the invention has been purged from patent doctrine.  Instead every substantive question in patent 
law is answered by reference to the claims, the legal descriptions of the ‘metes and bounds’ of a patent’s 
exclusionary reach.”). 
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patent owners, as it does when a defendant escapes liability for infringing a 
patent because even though he copied the new feature of the patentee’s in-
vention, he did not include an old element required by the patent claim.7 
It turns out, however, to be hard to sustain a rule that a law concerned 
with novelty will pay no attention to the point of novelty.  And so point-of-
novelty issues crop up in a number of different doctrines in patent law: who 
counts as an inventor, whether the inventor has disclosed the “best mode” 
of practicing the invention, and when the sale of a product exhausts the pa-
tentee’s rights in the patent.8  Courts are inconsistent in whether and how 
they consider the point of novelty in answering these questions, but when 
the Federal Circuit is presented with a question in point-of-novelty terms, it 
most often falls back on the mantra that there is no point of novelty—no 
“gist” or “heart”—to an invention, even if such a holding means discarding 
longstanding precedent. 
It is time to rethink the point-of-novelty doctrine in patent law.  I argue 
that ignoring the point of novelty of an invention makes little sense as an 
across-the-board matter and leads to a variety of harmful consequences.  Al-
though refusing to focus on the point of novelty serves some valuable pur-
poses, there are other ways to achieve those objectives.  In the end, a patent 
regime that pays attention to what the patentee actually invented, not what 
the patent lawyer wrote down, is more likely to achieve the goal of promot-
ing innovation. 
This Essay is divided into three parts.  Part I discusses the point-of-
novelty doctrine and why it exists.  Part II describes the variety of situations 
in which patent law either applies or ignores that doctrine, either explicitly 
or implicitly.  Part III argues that patent law would be better off focusing on 
the point of novelty in evaluating inventions. 
I. THE POINT-OF-NOVELTY DOCTRINE 
A. Origins: The Rise of Peripheral Claiming  
To understand how patent law found itself in the odd position of ignor-
ing the very thing that makes the patentee’s invention novel, we must start 
with the central role of the patent claim in every aspect of the law.  Patent 
law defines the patentee’s invention not by what she actually built or de-
scribed but by the parameters of the patent claims.  Claims are the legal de-
finition of the invention.9  They are theoretically akin to the “metes and 
 
7  See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
8  See infra notes 57–61, 86–89 and accompanying text. 
9  E.g., Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 511 F.3d 1132, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“The basic principle of determining the scope of patent claims is that the 
claims provide the legal definition of the invention that is patented . . . .”).  
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bounds” of a real property deed because they define the outer boundaries of 
the patentee’s property.10  Unlike a real property deed, though, they rarely 
give much notice to the world of where those boundaries actually are.11  Be-
cause the words of the claim, not what the patentee actually built, deter-
mines both whether the patent is valid and whether a defendant has 
infringed it,12 claim language has come to have talismanic significance in 
patent law.  Indeed, essentially every patent case involves many different 
fights over the meaning of the words written by lawyers to try to capture the 
outer boundaries of the patentee’s legal right.13 
It was not always thus.  In the early decades of the country’s history, 
patents did not have claims at all.  A patent case was resolved by looking at 
what the patentee had built, assessing whether it was different from what 
had been built before and then comparing it to what the defendant had 
built.14  When patentees began to write claims in the nineteenth century, 
they served as sign posts calling out the key new feature of the patentee’s 
invention, not as fence posts identifying the outer boundaries.15  It was not 
until sometime after 1870 that courts converted from a central claiming sys-
tem, in which the patentee identified what was new about her invention, to a 
peripheral claiming system, in which the patentee sought to fence off what-
ever territory she could claim.16 
Even after the move to peripheral claims, some vestiges of central 
claiming remained.  A notable example is the so-called “Jepson” claim, in 
which patentees would claim their invention by stating what was already 
 
10  See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (4th ed. 2007) (“[I]nnumerable cases analogize claims to the ‘metes and 
bounds’ of a real property deed.”); cf. CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co., 224 F.3d 
1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“It is the totality of the prosecution history which defines and establishes 
the metes and bounds of the patent grant.”). 
11  See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46–94 (2008) (explaining how patent claims 
fail to provide sufficient notice of the boundaries of the invention). 
12  See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 
105 (2005). 
13  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Con-
struction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744–45 (2009). 
14  See id. at 1766–71. 
15  See id. at 1767 (“[P]atent drafters began to break out of the text a distinct, separate statement of 
the novel features of the invention as a one sentence ‘claim,’ in order to avoid the possibility that the 
patent might be viewed as intended to claim everything in the full description of the invention.”). 
16  Id. at 1769 (“Claims were initially thought of only as devices for clarifying the grant of a patent 
for validity purposes, but after some period of time, courts began employing claims in determining in-
fringement as well.  The result of this shift, not surprisingly, was for claims drafters to attempt to cover, 
by explicit claim language, every equivalent that a court might previously have recognized under the 
doctrine of equivalents.  Peripheral construction of claims gave every incentive for inventors, and the 
attorneys who represented them, to begin claiming out to the very edge of what was patentable.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
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known and then identifying their improvement.17  Thus, a Jepson claim 
might read  
In an automobile containing at least a chassis, wheels, a steering mechanism, a 
windshield, and wipers for said windshield, the improvement in which said 
wipers can be caused to function intermittently. 
In a sense, virtually all inventions are Jepson inventions: very few patents 
cover entirely new things as opposed to improvements on existing things.  
But Jepson claiming has fallen out of favor.  As late as 1980, nearly 15% of 
all patent claims were drafted in Jepson format.18  By 2008, that number had 
fallen to less than 1%.19 
With the move to peripheral claiming, patent courts began focusing 
more and more attention on the language of the patent claims.  That trend 
accelerated in 1996, when the Supreme Court decided that construing the 
meaning of those claims was a question of law for the courts.20  Perhaps it 
was inevitable that courts interpreting patent claim language would attempt 
to give meaning to all words, as they do with statutes and contracts, rather 
than picking and choosing the words that seem important.   
B. Combination Inventions and Obviousness 
In any event, there was an important class of invention for which 
choosing the point of novelty did not seem to make much sense: the combi-
nation patent.  Imagine a patent on a Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup.  Chocolate 
is known in the prior art.  So, separately, is peanut butter.  Reese, our inven-
tor, combines them.21  What is the novel piece of the invention?  Neither 
chocolate nor peanut butter is new; the novelty lies in the combination.   
In many cases, patent courts must decide whether combination inven-
tions of this sort are obvious to one skilled in the art.22  The rule against fo-
cusing on the point of novelty of an invention developed out of those cases, 
 
17  Ex parte Jepson, 1917 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 62, 67–68.  
18  Aaron R. Feigelson, Endangered Species: The Jepson Claim, 12:01 TUESDAY (June 2, 2009, 2:23 
PM), http://www.1201tuesday.com/1201_tuesday/2009/06/jepson.html (updated June 4, 2009, 1:56 
PM).  
19  Id. 
20  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996); Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).  
21  The candy manufacturer used to advertise the supposed serendipity of this combination with an 
accidental collision between two people, one of whom says, “Hey, you got your chocolate in my peanut 
butter,” to which the other replies, “You got peanut butter in my chocolate.”  See, e.g., Vintage 80s 
Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups Commercial W Walkers, YOUTUBE (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=DJLDF6qZUX0.   
22  See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1159–82 (2002) (describing judicial confusion and error when assessing the validity of 
complex software and biotechnology patents). 
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and the Federal Circuit has been particularly insistent in obviousness cases 
that there is no “gist,” “heart,” “core,” or point of novelty of an invention.23  
C. The Rule Expands  
But the point-of-novelty doctrine is not limited to the law of obvious-
ness.24  It also extends to anticipation: to invalidate a patent on grounds that 
it has been invented before, a single prior art reference must include all the 
elements of the claim in one document; if it doesn’t, the reference can’t an-
ticipate the claim even if everyone agrees that the omitted element is well-
known in the art.25  The rule against selecting a point of novelty applies to 
the related doctrine of double patenting, which prevents acquiring two pa-
tents on the same invention.26  It extends to the scope of patentable subject 
matter: a mathematical algorithm standing alone is probably not patentable, 
but the same algorithm implemented in a general-purpose computer proba-
bly is.27  It affects what the patentee must disclose: a patent is invalid if the 
 
23  See, e.g., Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Imps. Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]here is no legally recognizable ‘heart’ of the invention.”); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-
Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 449 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “[t]he court must view the 
claimed invention as a whole” and decrying the district court’s focus on a distilled “gist” or “core” of 
the invention); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]here is no legally 
recognizable or protected ‘essential,’ ‘gist,’ or ‘heart’ of the invention.”); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman 
Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1543 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (criticizing appellant for focusing on the 
“purported point of novelty” rather than the invention “as a whole” in its obviousness arguments (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 
1983). 
24  For a nice discussion of the role of the doctrine in a variety of contexts, see Bernard Chao, Break-
ing Aro’s Commandment: Recognizing That Inventions Have Heart, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 1183 (2010). 
25  E.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1100–01 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Notions of 
‘concept’, ‘essence’, ‘key’, ‘gist’, etc., are no more useful in the context of § 102 than elsewhere, be-
cause they divert the fact-finder’s attention from the subject matter of the invention as a whole. . . .  ‘An-
ticipation’ for the purposes of § 102 requires ‘the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements 
of a claimed invention arranged as in that claim’.” (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 
1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  
26  E.g., Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[R]ather than focusing on 
the point of novelty, we wish to clarify that double patenting is determined by analysis of the claims as a 
whole.”). 
27  Recently, the law on this subject has been in turmoil as a result of Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218 (2010), which held that Bilski’s patent claim was too abstract but failed to provide any framework 
for defining abstractness.  See id. at 3231; see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The court today . . . impose[s] a new and far-reaching restriction on the 
kinds of inventions that are eligible to participate in the patent system . . . by redefining the word 
‘process’ in the patent statute, to exclude all processes that do not transform physical matter or that are 
not performed by machines.  The court thus excludes many of the kinds of inventions that apply today’s 
electronic and photonic technologies, as well as other processes that handle data and information in nov-
el ways.”); infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text (describing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), 
in which the Supreme Court held that a novel mathematical algorithm should not be patentable).  But the 
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inventor fails to describe his best mode of practicing the invention even if 
the omitted description is of a favored way of practicing an element long 
known in the art.28  It is relevant in claim construction: a patent claim can-
not be construed to include elements that are not expressly present in the 
claim even if the text of the patent reveals that those elements are the heart 
of the invention.29  It affects infringement: a defendant will escape liability 
if she omits even one element of a claim even if that element has nothing to 
do with the inventor’s idea.30  And while the doctrine of equivalents exists 
to avoid the unfairness of such a result by finding infringement where new 
products are only insubstantially different from the patented invention, that 
doctrine too has been limited so that each element of a patent claim must 
have an equivalent, not on the invention as a whole or what makes it 
unique.31  Finally, the rule against considering the point of novelty affects 
damages: a reasonable royalty is calculated based on the royalty base of 
                                                                                                                           
patentability of an algorithm implemented in a general purpose computer was clearly the law throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s.  See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the 
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001).  For a brief time before 1981, the courts did focus on 
the point of novelty in evaluating patentability, see, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 588, but after 1981, that was 
no longer the case, see, e.g., In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 791 (C.C.P.A. 1982).  For a discussion of the 
implications of Bilski, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R. Polk 
Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011).   
For other applications of point-of-novelty analysis with respect to patentable subject matter, see In re 
Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1983), which casts doubt on the viability of the “printed 
matter” exception to patentable subject matter because that doctrine improperly focused on the point of 
novelty rather than on the invention as a whole. 
28  See, e.g., Ajinomoto Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 597 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he 
invention is the invention claimed.  It is not limited, as Ajinomoto asserts, to vague ‘innovative aspects’ 
or ‘inventive features’ of the invention, terms that appear nowhere in our best mode case law.” (citation 
omitted)). 
29  See MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We 
sympathize with the district court’s choice, since we agree that [the feature] is an essential element of 
the invention . . . .  However, we cannot endorse a construction analysis that does not identify ‘a textual 
reference in the actual language of the claim with which to associate a proffered claim construction.’” 
(quoting Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); Venta-
na Med. Sys., Inc. v. BioGenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Ormco Corp. v. Align 
Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (O’Malley, J., dissenting).  
30  See Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[I]f one or 
more of the claim limitations are not literally present in the accused device, [this] preclud[es] a finding 
of literal infringement . . . .”).  In Larami Corp. v. Amron, for instance, the inventor of a pump-action 
compressed air mechanism for extending the range of a water gun lost a patent suit against a defendant 
who used the same mechanism because the defendant’s products did not include an element of the claim 
related to where the water was stored in the gun.  27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1280. 1283–84 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  The 
water storage element was in the prior art, a necessary component of all water guns; the novelty of the 
patentee’s invention was in the compressed air pump.  See id. at 1281. 
31  See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 29 (1997); Pennwalt 
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934–35 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
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products actually sold,32 which is in turn affected by the scale of the product 
being claimed.33  For example, if the inventor of the intermittent windshield 
wiper claims an improved car containing the wiper, damages may well be 
calculated based on the price of the whole car because we don’t distinguish 
between the novel elements of the claim and the preexisting ones. 
In short, the rule that there is no point of novelty, no heart of the inven-
tion, is well established in many areas of patent law beyond obviousness.34  
Indeed, the principle is so accepted that the Federal Circuit has used it to 
dismantle longstanding doctrines that depend on a point of novelty.  In 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the court abolished the longstanding 
point-of-novelty test for design patents, which had required proof that the 
defendant copied a novel aspect of the plaintiff’s design.35  The court re-
placed the point-of-novelty test with the ordinary-observer test for in-
fringement, which asks whether an ordinary observer would think the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s designs were the same even if the similarities 
were already known in the art.36 
II. CRACKS IN THE FAÇADE 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s widespread adoption of the rule against 
focus on a point of novelty, the point-of-novelty approach keeps reappear-
ing in a variety of contexts.  Perhaps this is inevitable: it often makes little 
or no sense to ignore what is novel about the invention.  Section A consid-
ers some contexts in which point-of-novelty analysis survives in patent law.  
Section B considers some circumstances in which it doesn’t but arguably 
should. 
 
32  Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Calculation 
of a reasonable royalty . . . requires determination of . . . a royalty base, or the revenue pool implicated 
by the infringement . . . .”). 
33  See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing 
patent damages and the relevant factors of a reasonable royalty calculus, including “what plaintiff’s 
property was, to what extent defendant has taken it, its usefulness and commercial value as shown by its 
advantages over other things and by the extent of its use, and the commercial situation” (citations omit-
ted in original) (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).  
34  See, e.g., Chao, supra note 24, at 1185 (referring to the rule that there is no point of novelty as 
“one of the basic commandments in patent law”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Pa-
tent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2160 (2008) (calling point of novelty a “rejected concept”); F. 
Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking Contracting Options off the 
Table?, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315, 321 (2007) (arguing that the line of cases that focused on 
the point of novelty has been “jettison[ed]”). 
35  543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
36  Id. at 670, 678. 
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A. Ignoring the Commandment 
Despite its status as a “commandment” of patent law,37 the Federal Cir-
cuit has often ignored the no-point-of-novelty rule when circumstances de-
manded it.  Here are a few examples. 
1. Inventorship.—Joint inventorship is quite common.38  And because 
joint inventors each own an undivided interest in the whole patent,39 people 
other than the named inventor often claim that they should have been in-
cluded as joint inventors as well.40  
An individual is a joint inventor of a patent if she contributes to the 
conception of that invention.41  Merely building the device someone else has 
designed is not invention.42  But if the putative joint inventor contributed to 
the conception of the invention as claimed, she is entitled to be listed on the 
patent and to jointly own the resulting invention.43  
That legal standard sits uneasily, however, with the rule against a point 
of novelty.  Imagine that the inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper 
took my advice above and claimed a car with various features, including 
wheels, a chassis, a steering column, and an intermittent windshield wiper.  
Can the inventor’s lab assistant claim to be a joint inventor by suggesting 
that the car should have wheels?  If we took seriously the idea that all claim 
elements were coequal, there would be no more value to contributing the 
novel feature of the invention than to contributing something from the prior 
art.  But of course that is nonsense.  And the law properly denies inventor-
ship claims from people who contribute only knowledge found in the prior 
art.44  In doing so, the law focuses on the point of novelty: those who con-
 
37  Chao, supra note 24, at 1185. 
38  See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of 
Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000) (reporting that “[m]ost inventions in [their] 
study were not developed by a single individual” and that the median patent issued between June 1996 
and May 1998 had more than one inventor). 
39  See Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Each co-owner 
of a United States patent is ordinarily free to make, use, offer to sell, and sell the patented invention 
without regard to the wishes of any other co-owner.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2006)). 
40  For examples from among the myriad cases involving such claims, see Shum v. Intel Corp., 
499 F.3d 1272, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1354 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004); Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1303–04, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1458–60 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Stark v. Ad-
vanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1226–27 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
41  E.g., BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 338 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
42  See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460. 
43  See id.  Indeed, she must contribute to only one claim in order to have ownership rights over 
every claim in the patent.  Id. 
44  See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 376 F.3d at 1362 (“A contribution of information in the prior art cannot give 
rise to joint inventorship because it is not a contribution to conception.”); Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 
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tribute new claim elements are inventors; those who contribute claim ele-
ments from the prior art are not.  Any other rule would be unworkable be-
cause it would treat as joint inventors any number of people who did not in 
fact contribute anything that made the invention patentable. 
2. Inequitable Conduct.—Patent law punishes those who lie to the 
patent office by deeming their patents unenforceable.45  But “inequitable 
conduct” is committed not only by those who affirmatively mislead the 
PTO but also by applicants who withhold relevant prior art.46  Relevance is, 
as always with patent law, determined by the patent claims.47  Here too a 
strict rule that all claim elements are equal proves unworkable.  Just as we 
don’t want the person who suggested adding wheels to a car to get credit for 
the intermittent windshield wiper, we don’t want windshield-wiper inven-
tors to have their patents rendered unenforceable because they didn’t turn 
over prior art relating to wheels or car bodies.   
Once again, the law accommodates this concern by reintroducing the 
point-of-novelty analysis.  Relevant prior art is defined as information that a 
reasonable patent examiner would have considered material to a determina-
tion of patentability.48  And courts regularly recognize that examiners will 
only consider prior art to be material if it is at the point of novelty of the in-
vention.49  We may act in other contexts as if all claim elements are equal, 
but in inequitable conduct, as in inventorship, we recognize that they are 
not. 
                                                                                                                           
1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“All that is required of a joint inventor is that he or she (1) contribute in 
some significant manner to the conception or reduction to practice of the invention, (2) make a contribu-
tion to the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured 
against the dimension of the full invention, and (3) do more than merely explain to the real inventors 
well-known concepts and/or the current state of the art.”); Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460 (“One who simply 
provides the inventor with well-known principles or explains the state of the art . . . does not qualify as a 
joint inventor.”). 
Combination patents present a problem for this rule because often each putative inventor is contri-
buting a piece from the prior art.  The inventor in that instance should be whoever thought to combine 
the prior art elements in a novel way.  For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.A. 
45  See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
46  See id. 
47  See id. 
48  Id. at 1562. 
49  See, e.g., eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTec USA, L.L.C., 480 F.3d 1129, 1136–37 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (find-
ing undisclosed declarations material because they were related to the point of novelty of the applica-
tion); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (finding inequitable conduct where the examiner twice reiterated the importance of a specific 
point of novelty in the application and the applicant therefore should have known that any information 
related to that point of novelty would be material to the examiner); see also Pharmacia Corp. v. Par 
Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]hese misleading declarations go to the very 
point of novelty.”). 
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3. Contributory Infringement.—To infringe a patent, a defendant 
must make, use, or sell a product or process that incorporates each and 
every element of the patent claim.50  If even one element is missing, there is 
no infringement.  Infringement liability extends not only to those who ac-
tually make, use, or sell the infringing technology51 but also to those who 
materially contribute to infringement by another.52  A defendant contributes 
to infringement by selling a product that is a “material part” of a patented 
invention to another that he knows will use the product as part of an infring-
ing combination.53 
We worry about holding the sellers of ordinary goods—say, car tires—
liable for the uses to which their products are put.  If every seller of tires, 
computers, or screws had to worry about patent infringement liability based 
on what her customers did with the products she sold, modern commerce 
would be much more difficult.  As a result, patent law creates a safe harbor 
for the sellers of products.  They are not liable for contributory infringement 
for selling products that are “staple article[s] . . . of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use.”54  Because of this safe harbor, a seller’s lia-
bility for contributory infringement depends not only on whether some buy-
ers use her product to infringe but also on whether other buyers have 
legitimate uses for the product.  If the only substantial use of the product is 
in the patented combination, the product itself is essentially treated as with-
in the scope of the patent, and the patentee can prevent its sale.55   
In effect, the doctrine of contributory infringement creates a point-of-
novelty rule.  If a component was already known in the prior art before the 
patentee’s invention—that is, it has other uses already—the sale of that 
component will not trigger liability.  But one who sells a new component 
specially designed to work in the patented invention is liable.  Liability for 
contributory infringement accordingly depends on whether the component 
sold is at the point of novelty of the invention or merely a claim element 
that recites the prior art.56 
 
50  See MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.2 (2009), available at http://www.
nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/NationalPatentJuryInstructions.pdf.   
51  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
52  See id. § 271(c). 
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP 
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
§3.3a2 (2d ed. Supp. 2010) (discussing cases drawing this line). 
56  The line is not quite this clear.  Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. suggests that, in very 
unusual circumstances, a defendant might be liable for selling a preexisting product.  448 U.S. 176, 221–
23 (1980).  The chemical in that case, propanil, had been known for decades, but it had no known use 
until the patentees began using it as an herbicide and patented that use.  See id. at 181–82.  So we can 
think of propanil as a useful product as constituting the point of novelty of the invention.  
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4. Exhaustion.—A patent owner exhausts her control over a patented 
device with the first authorized sale.57  That’s why one doesn’t need a patent 
license to drive a car or to resell it used, despite the fact that the car undoub-
tedly has patented technology in it.58   
This exhaustion doctrine is fairly straightforward when the item the pa-
tentee sells is the very item she patented.  When the two don’t coincide, 
however, things grow more complicated.  Selling a car with intermittent 
windshield wipers on it should exhaust the patentee’s rights over that par-
ticular automobile.  So, arguably, should selling intermittent windshield wi-
pers standing alone.  But selling a car without intermittent windshield 
wipers shouldn’t exhaust the patent rights even if the car has all the other 
elements of the patent claim.   
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court 
resolved this problem by asking whether the product being sold captured 
the “essential features” of the invention.59  The sale there was by a licensee, 
Intel, of chips that defendant Quanta put into its devices.  LG owned a pa-
tent on methods of configuring devices with those chips.  Intel paid LG for 
a license to make the chips, on the theory that the chips had no substantial 
use except to infringe the LG patent, such that Intel would be contributing 
to infringement by selling them.  After Intel paid LG for the license, LG 
sought to get paid again by the downstream device manufacturers, including 
Quanta, who LG claimed directly infringed its patents by using Intel prod-
ucts incorporating LG’s patents.60  The Court concluded that LG’s license to 
Intel exhausted its patent rights because Intel made an authorized sale, not 
of the whole invention but of the “essential features”—that is, the product 
that was at the point of novelty.61 
5. Occasional Uses: Claim Construction, Obviousness, and Enable-
ment.—Even in claim construction and obviousness cases, the bastions of 
the “no heart of the invention” doctrine, courts don’t always apply that ca-
non consistently.  That’s because doing so often has silly consequences.  
For example, in Slimfold Manufacturing Co. v. Kinkead Industries, Inc., the 
patent claim was to a device for bifold doors with an improved spring that 
allowed them to be easily installed.62  Doctrinally, the rule is clear: the in-
vention is a door that has certain parts (e.g., wood, a knob, hinges).  But the 
court ignored all that, reasoning that the invention as a whole was not the 
door but a pivot rod assembly for the door because all the other elements of 
 
57  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008). 
58  That is, of course, unless it’s more than twenty years old and the patents have expired.  In which 
case, you really should get a new car.  The American economy is counting on you.   
59  553 U.S. at 631 (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249–51 (1942)). 
60  This is admittedly a simplification of the facts.  For more detail, see id. at 621–24. 
61  Id. at 633–34, 638. 
62  932 F.2d 1453, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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the door were well known.63  In other words, the real invention—the point 
of novelty—was the pivot rod assembly. 
Courts in obviousness cases do something similar when confronted 
with patent claims in which the only difference between the claimed inven-
tion and the prior art is a different numerical range, whether of percentage 
chemical composition, binding activity, temperature, or any other element.  
For instance, in Iron Grip Barbell Co., the prior art disclosed circular 
weights with one, two, and four handholds, and the patentee claimed a cir-
cular weight with three handholds.64  The worry with these claims is that pa-
tentees may be filling in gaps in the prior art by identifying a known 
technology and claiming around the edges of that technology.  In those cas-
es, courts abandon their focus on the supposedly coequal elements of the 
invention and, surprisingly for a patent system that otherwise never puts the 
burden on the patentee to prove entitlement to a patent, presume that the in-
vention is obvious.65  To overcome that presumption, the patentee must 
show that the particular range chosen is “critical” to the success of the in-
vention.66  Only if the new range (the novel piece of the invention) is signif-
icantly different from the old will the patent be considered nonobvious.   
Finally, one recent Federal Circuit decision has applied a point-of-
novelty approach to enablement, the requirement that patentees provide suf-
ficient instructions that one of skill in the art can make and use their inven-
tion.67  In Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North 
America, Inc., the court held that a patent claim that covered both mechani-
cal and electronic impact sensors for airbags was not supported by a patent 
specification that only taught mechanical sensors.68  The patentee tried to 
avoid this result by arguing that people in the field would know how to con-
struct an electronic sensor and that, therefore, the patentee didn’t have to 
teach it.69  The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, concluding that the 
specification, not the general knowledge of the field, must teach the “novel 
 
63  See id.  
64  Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
65  See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We find this case 
analogous to the optimization of a range or other variable within the claims that flows from the ‘normal 
desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known.’” (quoting In re Peter-
son, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); In re Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330 (“We therefore conclude 
that a prior art reference that discloses a range encompassing a somewhat narrower claimed range is suf-
ficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness.”); In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (C.C.P.A. 
1980). 
66  In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The law is replete with cases in which 
the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range or other variable within the 
claims. . . .  [I]n such a situation, the applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally 
by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range.”). 
67  See 35 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (West 2011).  
68  501 F.3d 1274, 1281–82, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
69  Id. at 1283. 
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aspects” of the invention.70  The court thus distinguished between the novel 
elements and other elements; the patent doesn’t have to teach the latter as 
long as people in the field can figure them out.  
Inventorship, inequitable conduct, contributory infringement, and ex-
haustion are all doctrines that explicitly invoke the point of novelty.  Not so 
for claim construction, enablement, or obviousness.  But even in those latter 
doctrines we can find instances of courts paying attention to the heart of the 
invention when it seems foolish to do anything else.   
B. Blindly Following the Commandment 
As we have seen, courts don’t always follow their own point-of-
novelty rule.  Sometimes they do pay attention to the point of novelty of an 
invention.  But in many other cases, courts recite the mantra that there is no 
heart of the invention and use that rule to decide cases.  Quite often, though, 
applying the no-point-of-novelty doctrine leads them astray.  I discuss some 
examples in this section. 
1. Repair and Reconstruction.—We begin with the area of law that 
gives rise to the no-point-of-novelty doctrine: the law of repair.  Once pa-
tent law established that the owner of a particular patented machine was 
free to use or sell it as he pleased, problems began to arise around owners’ 
efforts to repair the device rather than purchase a new one from the paten-
tholder.  The exhaustion doctrine was supposed to give the purchaser con-
trol over the thing he bought, not exempt him from ever having to buy from 
the patentholder again.  Courts faced with these cases drew a line between 
“repair” of a patented invention, which was within the scope of the exhaus-
tion right, and “reconstruction” of the invention, which was tantamount to 
impermissibly building a new copy.71 
But how do we know when an owner is repairing and when he is re-
constructing?  In Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co., Convertible Top Replacement owned a patent on convertible car top 
 
70  See id. (“It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the 
novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement.” (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. 
Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  For crit-
icism of this result, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 
779 (2011). 
71  For discussion of this shift, see Arthur J. Gajarsa, Evelyn Mary Aswad & Joseph S. Cianfrani, 
How Much Fuel to Add to the Fire of Genius? Some Questions About the Repair/Reconstruction Dis-
tinction in Patent Law, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1205 (1999), which explores the confused repair–
reconstruction jurisprudence and discussing challenges for patentees in attempting to redefine “imper-
missible reconstruction” through contracts with their buyers, and Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocry-
phal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 
423 (1999), which argues that the exhaustion principle should not continue to serve as the organizing 
principle behind the repair–reconstruction line. 
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assemblies that functioned with fabric covers.72  The defendant, Aro, sold 
replacement fabric car tops.73  The district court and the court of appeals 
held that Aro’s sales of the replacement car tops crossed the line from repair 
into reconstruction because the top was a major feature of the invention so 
that no one could call it a “minor repair” to the overall invention.74  The Su-
preme Court reversed.  In language that gave rise to the no-point-of-novelty 
doctrine, the Court said that it didn’t matter that the fabric tops were the 
most important part of the invention because “this Court has made it 
clear . . . that there is no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ ele-
ment, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination patent.”75 
Bernard Chao has done an able job of dismantling the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Aro.76  I won’t repeat his criticisms here.  But it is worth noting 
that the Court’s insistence that there was no heart of the invention led it to 
what may well be the wrong result.  The Court held that car owners could 
bypass the patent on convertible top assemblies by replacing what is argua-
bly the most important part of the top an unlimited number of times.77  The 
issue is further complicated because the patent was on a combination.  But 
unless the novel feature of the invention was something other than the 
whole assembly, the Court’s decision allowed a third-party supplier to cap-
ture a significant part of the value supposedly resident in the invention. 
2. Written Description.—Section 112 of the Patent Act requires that 
the patentee provide a written description of her invention that is sufficient-
ly clear to enable any person having ordinary skill in the art to make and 
use the invention.78  The Federal Circuit has interpreted this language to im-
pose two separate requirements: that the patentee teach enough to enable a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention and, 
separately, that the patent contain a “written description” of the invention.79   
Courts and scholars have struggled to explain why we need a written 
description requirement separate from the enablement requirement.80  After 
 
72  365 U.S. 336, 337–38 (1961).  
73  Id. at 338. 
74  See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 270 F.2d 200, 205 (1st Cir. 1959).   
75  Aro, 365 U.S. at 344–45. 
76  See Chao, supra note 24, at 1205–14.  Among other things, Chao points out that the two cases the 
Supreme Court relied upon as evidence of this proposition were 1940s cases that Congress specifically 
intended to reverse in passing the 1952 Patent Act.  See id. at 1209–14. 
77  See Aro, 365 U.S. at 346. 
78  35 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (West 2011). 
79  See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
80  See, e.g., Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(Rader, J., concurring) (“[O]utside its proper context of policing priority, [the written description re-
quirement] never makes sense but compounds the confusion, increases the chances for error, and aug-
ments the expense of the trial process. . . .  The erroneous written description requirement . . . lacks both 
a statutory and a logical foundation.”); Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper 
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all, if an ordinary scientist in the field understands the invention and can 
make use of it, shouldn’t that be enough?  The most reasonable theory is 
that proof of written description is necessary to show that the patentee was 
in possession of the invention at the time she filed her patent application.81  
On this view, the written description requirement is designed to prevent 
“late claiming” by a patentee who changes her claims during the prosecu-
tion process to cover things she didn’t actually understand when she filed 
her patent application.  That approach was adopted by the Federal Circuit in 
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.82  The patentee there amended its 
claims to cover the defendant’s idea, one the patentee clearly didn’t have in 
mind when it filed its original application.83 
Unfortunately, subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have used the no-
point-of-novelty rule to read Gentry Gallery—and the late-claiming con-
cern—out of written description law.  Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rous-
sel, Inc. is instructive: 
TKT’s remaining arguments rely on Gentry Gallery.  However, we see Gentry 
Gallery as similarly inapt.  TKT would have us view Gentry as a watershed 
case, in reliance on an isolated statement—probably only dicta—that one of 
ordinary skill in the art would clearly understand that the location of the reclin-
ing controls on the claimed sectional sofa “was not only important, but essen-
tial to [the] invention.”  But as we recently indicated in Cooper Cameron 
Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., “we did not announce [in Gentry] a 
new ‘essential element’ test mandating an inquiry into what an inventor con-
siders to be essential to his invention and requiring that the claims incorporate 
those elements.” . . . cf. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. 
                                                                                                                           
Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 
17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2007) (concluding that the written description requirement has had a rela-
tively minor impact in the courts and the PTO); Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending 
with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2000) (arguing that by perpetuating an artificial distinction between the written de-
scription and the enablement requirements, the Federal Circuit has given itself unchecked authority to 
invalidate patent claims for inadequate disclosure); Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Re-
port from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (2007) (arguing that most written description cases 
could have been decided on enablement grounds instead); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application 
of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 
(1998) (arguing that the written description requirement would likely chill development in biotechnolo-
gy and discourage prompt disclosure of new inventions); Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Descrip-
tion Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222 (1998) (describing the 
establishment of a written description requirement as “an unmitigated disaster”).  
81  Enablement might serve that purpose too.  See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 
59 SMU L. REV. 123, 147–50 (2006). 
82  134 F.3d 1473, 1479–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1341, 1351 (explaining that 
in order to satisfy the written description requirement, “the specification must describe an invention un-
derstandable to [the] skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed” 
(emphasis added)).  
83  See Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479. 
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(“[T]here is no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential element,’ ‘gist’ or 
‘heart’ of the invention in a combination patent.”).84  
Unfortunately, in doing so the Federal Circuit has replaced a conceptually 
sound basis for a separate written description requirement with one that is 
impossible to distinguish from enablement except that it seems to apply 
even when enablement doesn’t.  A requirement that a patentee must de-
scribe and show possession of the “full scope” of a patented invention argu-
ably makes no sense as applied to modern peripheral claims, which cover 
an infinite number of possible embodiments.85  A written description doc-
trine that requires proof that the patentee actually possessed the novel fea-
tures of the invention at the time of filing makes sense.  A written 
description doctrine that doesn’t focus on those novel features does not. 
3. Best Mode.—The first paragraph of § 112 also requires that the pa-
tentee set forth the “best mode” she knows of practicing her invention.86  
Unlike most doctrines in patent law, which focus on what the person of skill 
in the art would perceive, the best mode doctrine is entirely subjective.  
Whether the inventor has a preferred mode of implementing the invention 
and, if so, what it is depend entirely on the mindset of the individual named 
inventor.   
In Ajinomoto Co. v. International Trade Commission, the patentee 
claimed a method for cultivating a strain of bacteria to produce L-lysine but 
did not disclose the particular bacteria the inventor favored.87  The patentee 
argued that it had disclosed the best mode of practicing the “innovative as-
pects” of the invention, but the court rejected that argument, falling back on 
the idea that there is no point of novelty in a patent.88  The best mode re-
quirement, it said, “is not limited . . . to vague ‘innovative aspects’ or ‘in-
ventive features’ of the invention, terms that appear nowhere in our best 
mode case law.”89 
The best mode doctrine has been criticized as a potential trap for the 
unwary because it is not obvious to nonspecialists that they must do more 
 
84  314 F.3d 1313, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (alterations in original) (citations omitted); see also Vas-
Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (chastising the district court for attempting 
to identify the “novel or important” part of the invention). 
85  Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1222–25 (2008). 
86  35 U.S.C.A. § 112(a) (West 2011). The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act of 2011 provides that 
failure to satisfy the best mode requirement will no longer render a patent invalid in cases filed after 
September 16, 2011.  Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15.  So this section is primarily of historical interest.  But 
best mode remains a requirement for patentees, at least in theory. 
87  597 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
88  Id. at 1273–74. 
89  Id. at 1274. 
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than teach people of skill in the art how to make and use their inventions.90  
Unfortunately, the no-point-of-novelty rule heightens this problem.  An in-
ventor might know that she needs to disclose the technical details of her fa-
vored implementation of her new idea.  Unless she reads patent cases, 
however, she is unlikely to suspect that she must disclose her favored ways 
of practicing those elements of the invention that have long been known in 
the art.  Under this doctrine, the court would invalidate a patent on the car 
with intermittent windshield wipers if the inventor did not disclose her pre-
ferred brand of tires, a rather extreme requirement. 
4. Design Patents.—The law of design patents quite prominently fea-
tured a point-of-novelty rule until recently.  Unlike standard “utility” pa-
tents covering inventions, which are defined by the language of written 
claims, design patents covering new ornamental features of an object are 
defined in substantial part by a drawing of the patentee’s design.91  The ba-
sic test for infringement of a design patent is the “ordinary observer” test, 
which assesses “whether an ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art, 
would be deceived into thinking that the accused design was the same as the 
patented design.”92  But that test has long been supplemented by a require-
ment that the defendant have appropriated the point of novelty of the inven-
tion.93  If the defendant’s use didn’t include the novel feature(s) in the 
patentee’s design, it couldn’t infringe. 
In 2008, in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
changed the law of design patents to eliminate the point-of-novelty test for 
infringement.94  The court worried that a focus on the point of novelty 
would confuse factfinders, particularly in the subset of cases in which the 
patentee’s invention was a combination of existing features rather than the 
development of a new one.95  The focus, as with utility patents, must be on 
the overall appearance of the whole design, not on “small” differences at 
the point of novelty.96  Novelty still matters, but now only as a defense that 
 
90  See Harold C. Wegner, Continued Prosecution in a Continuation Application, or a Transco Best 
Mode Trap for the Unwary?, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 837 (1993); see also NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 120–21 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard 
C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (recommending that the doctrine be eliminated for other rea-
sons).  Legislation proposed in Congress in the past decade would have eliminated the doctrine.  See Pa-
tent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 4(d)(1)(B). 
91  Mary Bellis, Design Patent: The Importance of Great Drawings and Correct Formatting, 
ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/od/designpatents/a/design_patent_f_4.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 
2012).   
92  Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 672 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
93  Id. at 670–71. 
94  Id. at 678. 
95  Id. at 677. 
96  Id. 
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must generally be assessed separately from infringement.97  And subsequent 
Federal Circuit cases have used Egyptian Goddess as precedent in conclud-
ing that point of novelty is no longer the test for the invalidity of a design 
patent either.98 
Think about this for a minute.  It is no longer the law that the defendant 
must incorporate the very thing that makes the patented invention patenta-
ble.  As long as an ordinary observer would confuse the two products, the 
fact that that confusion arises from similarities that already exist in the prior 
art doesn’t defeat a finding of infringement.  It might or might not create a 
defense that the patent is invalid for anticipation, though again that seems to 
depend on what an ordinary observer would think when comparing the pa-
tented design and the prior art.99  Translated for a moment into terms of util-
ity patents, it is as though we granted a patent on a car having an 
intermittent windshield wiper as the novel feature and then allowed the pa-
tentee to sue a car maker that didn’t include that feature because the cars 
otherwise had the same elements.  That can’t possibly be the right rule. 
The Federal Circuit did express concerns with how the point-of-
novelty test worked as applied to patents on combinations.  I discuss that 
concern in more detail in the next Part.100  And the court took some steps to 
try to sneak back in the prior-art comparison it had just rejected, declaring 
that the ordinary observer was henceforth one who was “familiar with the 
prior art.”101  So one reasonable reading of the case is that the court intended 
not to make the point of novelty irrelevant but simply to change the burden 
of proof on whether the defendant appropriated the novelty of the patentee’s 
invention.102  This concern with the appropriate burden of proof is similar to 
what motivates the court in utility patent cases to reject the practicing-the-
prior-art defense103: defendants shouldn’t be able to turn a defense that they 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence into something that the plain-
tiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 
But if avoiding burden-shifting was the court’s goal, it didn’t do a very 
good job of achieving it.  Whatever the legal standard, we don’t want paten-
tees suing defendants who do no more than practice the prior art.  Such suits 
can’t succeed in utility patent law because of the requirement that each ele-
ment be present in the accused device.  If the defendant is merely practicing 
 
97  See id. at 678. 
98  See, e.g., Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  For a discussion of this extension, see Marta Kowalczyk, Recent Developments, Design Patent 
Infringement: Post-Egyptian Goddess, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 250–56. 
99  See Int’l Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1237–38. 
100  See infra Part III.A.   
101  Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677, 681.  
102  See id. at 678–79.   
103  See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“‘[P]racticing the prior art’ is not a defense to patent infringement.”). 
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the prior art and the patent is construed so broadly that it covers what the 
defendant is doing, the patent will be invalid.104  So to infringe a utility pa-
tent, the defendant must include the thing that makes the invention patenta-
ble.  But after Egyptian Goddess, there is no longer such a requirement in 
design patent law.  A design patent can now be infringed even by a product 
that lacks the new feature encompassed by the patent as long as an ordinary 
observer would think the two were substantially the same.  The legal doc-
trine that prevented that from happening—the point-of-novelty test—fell 
victim to the commandment that inventions must not have a gist even when 
they do. 
5. Claim Construction and Infringement.—In a peripheral claiming 
system, the outer boundaries of the patent are defined by the language of the 
patent claims.  Application of the principle that all elements of a patent have 
equal significance creates traps for unwary patent owners.  Many, perhaps 
all but one, of the elements of a patent claim are efforts to describe existing 
technology rather than to define what is new about the patentee’s invention.  
But a defendant can avoid infringement by eliminating any one of those 
elements even if it appropriates the point of novelty of the patentee’s inven-
tion in its entirety.   
The result is that patentees often lose their infringement cases because 
the defendant designs around the patent by avoiding a seemingly unimpor-
tant but claimed feature of the invention.  In Larami Corp. v. Amron, for 
example, the patentee invented a piston-pump mechanism for a water gun 
that allowed the gun to shoot much farther than prior guns.105  The patent 
claim covered a water gun with various elements, including a “housing . . . 
having a chamber therein for a liquid.”106  The patentee didn’t invent hold-
ing water in the barrel of the gun; the element was just included to define 
the prior-art gun the patentee had improved.  But because the defendant in 
that case stored the water outside the barrel of the gun, in a detachable re-
servoir, the court concluded that it did not infringe the patent.107 
In theory, the doctrine of equivalents takes care of problems like this 
by allowing a patentee to expand the scope of its claims to cover products 
that are only insubstantially different from the patented invention.108  But 
the Federal Circuit, in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,109 and the 
Supreme Court, a decade later in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chemical Co.,110 rejected the idea that a defendant could infringe under the 
 
104  See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).   
105  27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1280, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
106  Id. at 1283. 
107  Id. at 1283–84. 
108  See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950). 
109  833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
110  520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
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doctrine of equivalents because its product was insubstantially different 
from the patent as a whole.111  Rather, the doctrine of equivalents, like literal 
infringement, must be measured element by element.112  As a result, it falls 
victim to the same problem: the absence of an equivalent of a single prior-
art element will doom a doctrine-of-equivalents claim.  Indeed, the patentee 
in Larami lost its doctrine-of-equivalents argument for the same reason it 
lost on literal infringement: it didn’t store the water “in” the chamber or an-
ything like it.113 
Could the patentee in Larami have solved this problem by drafting the 
claims differently?  Perhaps, if it had foreseen the change Larami later 
made or if it had just been more parsimonious in the words it used in the 
claims.  But the point for our purposes is that the patentee shouldn’t have 
had to worry about the precise formulation of the words used to describe 
elements of its product that were already well-known in the art.  By focus-
ing attention on every element, including the old ones, the no-point-of-
novelty rule makes it much more likely that patentees will lose the very 
cases we should want them to win: ones, like Larami, in which the defen-
dant adopts the novel feature of the patent. 
The uncertainty associated with words also means that the no-point-of-
novelty rule renders patent scope less, not more, clear.  Patent claims are 
supposed to give the world notice of what is and is not claimed.114  But 
when patent litigation focuses on ambiguities in the words of claim ele-
ments that don’t even relate to what the patentee actually invented, the re-
sult is to enlarge the number of things we can’t predict about the validity 
and infringement of a patent. 
6. Damages.—If patent owners can hamstring themselves by includ-
ing prior art elements in their patent claims, why do they do it?  One answer 
has to do with the way damages are calculated.  We award as damages ei-
ther lost profits from sales or, if the patentee can’t show lost profits, a rea-
sonable royalty for the use of the invention.115  Those reasonable royalties 
are calculated as a percentage of the sales of a product; that is, the damage 
 
111  Id. at 28–30, 40 (holding that the doctrine of equivalents must involve an element-by-element 
comparison); Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934–36 (upholding the district court’s doctrine-of-equivalents anal-
ysis because it proceeded element by element). 
112  See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29; Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 935. 
113  Larami Corp. v. Amron, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1280, 1285–86 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
114  White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1886) (noting that a claim should not be treated “like a 
nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, 
so as to make it include something more than, or something different from, what its words ex-
press. . . .  The claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee 
define precisely what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to 
construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.”).  
115  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable 
Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 655 (2009). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1274 
award reflects a percentage royalty rate multiplied by the royalty base (the 
total sales of the relevant product).116 
But what is the relevant product?  If it is a small component with li-
mited sales, damages are likely to be small.  But if the royalty base is large, 
damages are likely to be higher.117  And here is where the no-point-of-
novelty rule works its mischief.  Rather than focusing on the novel feature 
of the patentee’s invention, the rule requires us to look at the whole claimed 
invention, regardless of whether the elements of that invention are novel or 
not.  As a result, if the inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper claims 
a windshield wiper, his damages in a lawsuit will be measured by the sale 
of windshield wipers.  But if he claims the identical invention as a car with 
an intermittent windshield wiper as an element, the royalty base is the sale 
of cars, a much larger number.  As a result, patent plaintiffs tend to draft 
their claims to cover whole products, not the pieces they actually contribute, 
and they are inclined to sue downstream integrated manufacturers rather 
than upstream component suppliers.   
One district court opinion, written by Federal Circuit Chief Judge Rad-
er, suggests that the royalty base should be the smallest marketable unit that 
incorporates the invention.118  The Federal Circuit, by contrast, has sug-
gested that the use of a broader royalty base is defensible although mista-
kenly characterizing the royalty base issue as involving the “entire market 
value rule.”119  Regardless of which approach prevails, as long as the “smal-
lest salable unit” is determined by the claims as a whole rather than by the 
novel component of the invention, it will be subject to manipulation by pa-
tentees seeking to increase the value of their patents. 
C. The Problem Is Systemic 
Treating old elements of an invention with the same force as the novel 
elements creates a number of problems for the patent system.  Sometimes 
we avoid those problems by ignoring the commandment and focusing on 
the point of novelty.  When we don’t, we often go astray. 
The problem is not simply with particular applications of the no-point-
of-novelty principle.  The problem is with the principle itself.  It makes lit-
 
116  See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable 
Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 632 (2010). 
117  See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 115, at 668–69.  Theoretically, this should be balanced by a lower 
percentage of that higher base.  In practice, however, factfinders aren’t very good at considering the oth-
er contributors to value and will tend to overstate the appropriate royalty percentage.  See, e.g., Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2029–35 (2007) 
(collecting evidence of this phenomenon). 
118  See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287–88 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
119  See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  For an explana-
tion of the court’s error in terminology—and what the real “entire market value rule” is about—see 
Lemley, supra note 115, at 668 n.63.  
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tle sense for a law focused on invention to pay no attention to what is inven-
tive about the patentee’s technology.  A legal system that once focused on 
what the patentee actually added—demanding a working model of the in-
vention and focusing the inquiry on that actual device120—was replaced over 
time by a system that focuses on the words added by patent lawyers.  In the 
early days of the patent system, there was no such thing as a patent claim.  
The claim developed as an optional device written by applicants to call at-
tention to what was new and different about the invention.121  Those claims 
gradually became expected, then required, and then the central focus of the 
patent inquiry.122  Today, we have reified the claims of the patent to such an 
extent that we are unwilling even to look behind those claims to see what 
parts of them reflect the patentee’s actual invention.  The result shouldn’t be 
surprising: both patentees and accused infringers use the ambiguity of those 
words to achieve their own ends.123 
The problem may be deeper than just the no-point-of-novelty rule.  The 
heart of the problem may be the law’s focus on the language of lawyer-
created claims rather than inventor-created technologies.124  But it seems 
clear that the no-point-of-novelty rule exacerbates the problem.  It prevents 
us from distinguishing the words that represent what the patentee added 
from the words that don’t, and it accordingly means that we are even further 
removed from the invention we are supposed to be protecting. 
III. CAN WE LIVE WITH POINT OF NOVELTY? 
Suppose we were to focus the attention of the patent system on the 
point of novelty of the invention.  Would the sky fall?  In this Part, I con-
sider some objections to a point-of-novelty approach and conclude that they 
can be overcome without much difficulty. 
A. Combination Inventions  
The first objection to a point-of-novelty system is the one that caused 
courts to shy away from it originally: inventions often take the form of 
combinations of existing elements rather than the creation of new ones.  
Combination inventions require the combination of all the elements, so one 
could argue that all the elements, or perhaps none of them, reflect the point 
of novelty. 
 
120  See History, ROTHSCHILD PETERSON PATENT MODEL MUSEUM, http://www.patentmodel.org/
about/history (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (describing the history of the requirement that patent applicants 
submit a model of their invention).   
121  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 13, at 1766–67. 
122  See id. at 1767. 
123  See id. at 1744–45 & nn.5–9. 
124  For a suggestion along these lines, see id. at 1744–46. 
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Combination patents are indeed an important category of inventions.  
But it doesn’t follow that a patent has no point of novelty simply because it 
is a combination of existing elements.  The novelty resides precisely in a 
combination that didn’t exist in the prior art: it is that new combination that 
should be the focus of our analysis.  What we want to know is whether the 
idea to combine, say, chocolate and peanut butter, is new and nonobvious; 
who thought to combine them and when?  Neither chocolate nor peanut but-
ter is the “main” part of the chocolate-plus-peanut-butter claim; it is the 
combination of the two that is the central feature of the invention. 
We think in precisely that way when considering inventorship claims.  
As noted above, a participant in the inventive process is not an inventor 
merely because she adds to the claims something known in the prior art.  To 
be an inventor, she must make a substantial contribution to the novel as-
pects of the invention.125  For a combination patent, a joint inventor accor-
dingly must contribute to the idea of combining things that have never been 
combined before.  There is no reason the same can’t be true of novelty, 
nonobviousness, and infringement analysis. 
B. Burdens of Proof 
A second worry that animates the resistance to point-of-novelty analy-
sis is one about the blurring of burdens of proof.  For example, the Federal 
Circuit in Egyptian Goddess was concerned that the point-of-novelty ele-
ment of infringement analysis allowed the defendant to sneak an invalidity 
argument (which he would have had to prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence) into infringement, thereby taking advantage of a lower burden of 
proof.126  This is the reason the Federal Circuit rejects “practicing the prior 
art” as a defense. 
The fact that infringement and validity involve different burdens of 
proof is a good reason to keep the analysis of the two legally separate.127  
 
125  See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
126  Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678–79 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
127  There is substantial debate over the extent to which the burdens should differ.  For arguments 
that the undifferentiated clear-and-convincing-evidence presumption of validity makes little sense, see, 
for example, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007), which explains that “[w]e need 
not reach the question whether the failure to disclose Asano during the prosecution of Engelgau voids 
the presumption of validity given to issued patents, for claim 4 is obvious despite the presumption.  We 
nevertheless think it appropriate to note that the rationale underlying the presumption—that the PTO, in 
its expertise, has approved the claim—seems much diminished here”; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lem-
ley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 48, 59–61 (2007), explain-
ing that “[a]s a result [of the presumption of validity], courts today regularly enforce overbroad and un-
undeserved patents, and strategic applicants continue to apply for undeserved patents knowing that there 
is a good chance the PTO will err”; and Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do 
Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the Presumption of Validity 3 (Stanford Law & 
Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 401, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568, which argues 
that the presumption is undermined because “patent examiners effectively ignore almost all applicant-
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But it doesn’t justify paying no attention to the point of novelty.  It is per-
fectly straightforward to focus on the novel aspect of the patentee’s inven-
tion separately in both inquiries, asking whether the defendant implemented 
the novel feature of the invention and whether the defendant can prove that 
feature was not in fact novel.128   
A focus on the point of novelty, even with different burdens of proof, 
avoids the conundrum created by Egyptian Goddess by which the defendant 
can infringe a design patent by copying only elements that are unquestiona-
bly in the prior art.  We can still separate validity and infringement analysis 
and apply a different burden of proof, and we should.  But we will at least 
be focusing both of those analyses on the right questions. 
C. Patentable Subject Matter 
A final proffered justification for the status quo lies in the history of 
point-of-novelty analysis in patentable subject matter.  Patent subject matter 
eligibility is generally quite broad, but abstract ideas, laws of nature, and 
natural phenomena are excluded from its scope.129  The courts have long 
distinguished between the patenting of natural laws or phenomena them-
selves and the patenting of practical applications or uses of those natural 
laws.  The former are forbidden, but the latter are not.130  Indeed, most in-
ventions at their heart involve a new application of some natural law or ob-
ject.   
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court decided Parker v. Flook.131  The 
patent there involved the use of a computer program to calculate an “alarm 
limit” in a catalytic conversion process to warn that it might need to be shut 
down if temperature, pressure, or flow got too high.132  The physical process 
was known in the prior art, but the computer program and the mathematical 
formula it employed were new.133  The Court ignored that fact, however: 
[T]he novelty of the mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all.  
Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of the 
                                                                                                                           
submitted art, relying almost exclusively on prior art they find themselves.”  The Supreme Court recent-
ly considered this issue but declined to narrow the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.  Microsoft 
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242–43 (2011).  What is clear is that the patent statute re-
quires at least some burden of proof be placed on defendants, see 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006), so the burdens 
of proof for infringement and validity will never be identical. 
128  It is true that at some point in this process the court will have to identify a novel feature of the 
invention, so it may make sense to approach validity first if the parties cannot agree on the alleged point 
of novelty. 
129  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
130  See, e.g., Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 27, at 1335–37. 
131  437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
132  Id. at 585–86. 
133  Id. 
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claimed invention, as one of the “basic tools of scientific and technological 
work,” it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.134 
The court offered an interesting twist on the point of novelty: it dissected 
the invention to find the point of novelty but then concluded that the novel 
mathematical algorithm should be ignored because mathematical algorithms 
shouldn’t count.  That conclusion was quite remarkable.  Under that ap-
proach, many drugs would be unpatentable because the discovery of their 
efficacy involves the mere identification of a previously unknown natural 
phenomenon.135  Computer software would be unpatentable because it is 
composed of algorithms.  Even the classic mercury thermometer might not 
be patentable because it was based on the discovery of a physical attribute 
of mercury: the fact that it expands at a predictable rate as temperature in-
creases.136   
Fortunately, this Flook approach was short-lived.  The Supreme Court 
repudiated it three years later in Diamond v. Diehr, which held valid a pa-
tent claim almost exactly parallel to the one in Flook.137  Since Diehr, it has 
been generally accepted that patentable subject matter is evaluated by con-
sidering the claim as a whole.  As long as some elements of the claim in-
clude some physical device or transform an article to another state or thing, 
it doesn’t matter that the novel piece of the invention is based on an abstract 
idea or a natural phenomenon.138  While the Federal Circuit and Supreme 
Court decisions in Bilski v. Kappos revived parts of Flook’s holding, they 
did not revive its dissection approach.139 
It may be reasonable, therefore, to worry that a general focus on the 
point of novelty of the patent will mark a return to the bad old days of re-
strictive patentable subject matter eligibility.  In fact, however, the two are 
not necessarily connected.  First, the substantive restrictions on patenting 
abstract ideas or laws of nature are arguably misguided.140  There is good 
reason not to allow the patenting of ideas that we were already using, 
 
134  Id. at 591–92 (citation omitted) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
135  Taxol, for instance, a drug used in chemotherapy treatments, is derived from the bark of the Pa-
cific yew tree.  Chemotherapy Drugs—Taxol, CHEMOCARE.COM, http://www.chemocare.com/bio/taxol
.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
136  See Mercury—Thermometers, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/mercury/
thermometer-main.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
137  450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981). 
138  See, e.g., id. (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical 
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). 
139  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (stating that Diehr “established a limitation on 
the principles articulated in Benson and Flook. . . .  Diehr emphasized the need to consider the invention 
as a whole, rather than ‘dissect[ing] the claims into old and new elements and then . . . ignor[ing] the 
presence of the old elements in the analysis.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 188)). 
140  See Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 624–28 (2008). 
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whether knowingly or unknowingly.  But the novelty and inherency doc-
trines accommodate that concern.141  There is also good reason not to grant a 
patent on an idea in the abstract142 before it has been put to a specific, valu-
able use, but the utility doctrine specifically forecloses that possibility.143  
And there is good reason to worry about overbroad patent claims that lock 
up a wide swath of potential future applications.  But the enablement and 
written description doctrines largely address that concern.144  If my discov-
ery of a previously unknown idea or natural phenomenon has resulted in 
useful applications that the world never had before, and if I limit my patent 
claim to those useful applications, why shouldn’t I be entitled to a patent? 
Second, even if we think it important to preserve a separate abstract 
idea doctrine and not to count the new discovery itself, it is possible to do 
so in a point-of-novelty regime without adopting the dubious reasoning of 
Flook.  Consider the thermometer.  We could call the point of novelty the 
temperature-responsive expansion of the element mercury, and—per 
Flook—disentitle it to patent protection.  But we don’t have to.  We might 
instead observe that the application of that fact about the natural world—
putting the mercury in a test tube and marking it with temperature indica-
tors—is itself the point of novelty.  Or the point of novelty could be the 
combination of the natural phenomenon with the practical application. 
In short, the no-point-of-novelty rule has had the incidental benefit of 
avoiding a problematic interpretation of patentable subject matter.  But that 
fact doesn’t justify the whole edifice.  We can and should reject the reason-
ing of Parker v. Flook even in a point-of-novelty regime. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent law today goes out of its way to avoid focusing attention on 
what the patentee actually invented—the point of novelty of the invention.  
As one might suspect, the results have not been encouraging.  We will bet-
ter foster invention if we pay more attention to the inventions we are sup-
posed to be promoting.  Within some doctrines, the Federal Circuit does 
this either expressly or implicitly.  In other areas, however, its refusal to pay 
attention to the point of novelty results in problematic outcomes.  Going 
forward, courts should focus on the point of novelty in assessing patents.  
Doing so would be an important step towards a patent law that focuses on 
 
141  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 407–08 (2005) 
(explaining the inherency doctrine). 
142  I believe there is room for a narrow abstract ideas doctrine focused on overclaiming.  See Lem-
ley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 27, at 1328–29.  But that doctrine would not exclude any 
novel element of a patent claim in deciding whether the invention was patentable subject matter. 
143  See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966). 
144  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (1 How.) 62, 112–14 (1854); see also Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & 
Wagner, supra note 27, at 1329–32, 1340. 
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what the patentee actually invented rather than what the patent lawyers 
wrote. 
 
 
